Several months ago, in a review of Radicals for Capitalism, Tyler Cowen sketches the paradox of libertarianism: how classical liberalism partial triumphs in the 1970s and 80s led to increased government, and then discusses why he thinks “libertarians are becoming intellectually less important.” He also provides an outline of how he would “restructure” classical liberalism. There are things I like about his ideas, and some I dispute. Cowen argues that libertarians need to “stop fighting the last war” and come to grips with the New Deal and the welfare state—dammit, they’re not going away, however dreadful they are. Later on, he makes a reasonable case favoring action on climate-change, in an effective example comparing it to Russian roulette. But in the middle of his article he lays out a three-point “vision” for classical liberalism:
1. A deep belief in human liberty, but seeing positive liberty (“what can I do with my life?”) as more important than negative liberty (“how many regulations are imposed on me?”).
2. Accepting the package deal when it is indeed a package deal.
3. Identifying key areas where we can strengthen current institutions and also strengthen liberty.
Understanding that this is probably something off-the-cuff, and however pragmatic a plan it is, only his third point seems to be consistent with the heart of minarchist liberalism. His first would, in my estimation, turn classical liberalism into an imitation of compassionate conservatism. Or worse, an even more mealy-mouthed and incoherent left-liberalism. Perhaps I’m too harsh or too narrow-minded or simply not reading him correctly, but to elevate positive liberty over the negative would be to abandon the skepticism and suspicion of public power that informs all stripes of libertarians. To do so would seemingly turn libertarians into nothing better than the incoherent compassionate-conservatives or left-liberals.
As for his second point, it is one thing to accept popular if wrongheaded faits accomplis (like burying the hatchet with FDR’s legacy). It’s another thing to acquiesce to programs still on the legislative drawing-board. Medicare Part D was the creation of crude and improvident political calculation, not a response to a global financial and political crisis with the potential to threaten the tranquility and perhaps even the survival of the Republic.
To obtain political power and be able to influence policy for the better, I agree that compromises must be made. But I dislike the choices I see Cowen presenting: a future for libertarians of irrelevance or one of becoming competent and somewhat restrained technocrats.
it’s funny. you worry that acquiescence will render libertarianism irrelevant… i feel like its uncompromising nature already has. however reasonable your positions may be, will you ever get anywhere in a system where you can’t sell common sense?
But then, if one can’t sell common sense, must one then sell out? Mind you, I’m not against all compromise, as I wrote. Sometimes principles conflict, and one must make a choice, a trade-off in the hideous parlance of the economics field, or what I think of as a principled compromise.
in response to “must one then sell out?” i don’t know, i suppose that’s my question to you. are those the only two choices libertarians face?
Does Tyler really say all that? I’m surprised. Hoping for the triumph of positive liberty seems to be the redoubt of every philosopher who would be king. The underlying thought seems to be that there is a forward prescription for what ails society and– here it is! DO IT! I’ hoping I’m just misunderstanding my good facebook friend Tyler Cowen.
I honestly hope I was reading Tyler correctly, Admiral. And, Slade, I’m still thinking of an appropriate response to your question.